Inputs from Philosophy to Cognitive Science: the Example of L-concepts and the Suppression Task

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Miguel López-Astorga

Institute of Humanistic Studies “Juan Ignacio Molina”, University of Talca, Chile. Email address: milopez@utalca.cl

 Volume 12, Number 1, January-March, 2020 I Full Text PDF

DOI: 10.21659/rupkatha.v12n1.38

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Abstract

Although it is many times said that progress can be observed in none of the different subfields that are part of philosophy, this paper is intended to show otherwise by means of an example. That example is based upon the L-concepts that are introduced by Carnap in his method of extension and intension, and it refers to the idea that the underlying machinery of this last method is able to solve problems such as those that reasoning exercises such as the suppression task raise in the cognitive science field nowadays. As it is accounted for, the key is to assume that the human mind is somehow linked to state-descriptions akin to those proposed by Carnap.

Keywords: Carnap; method of extension and intension; semantics; state-descriptions; suppression task