Media Studies

Oksana Zakharova

¹Department of Art Management and Technology Events, National Academy of Management of Culture and Arts, Kyiv, Ukraine. E-mail: o.zakharova@tanu.pro

Rupkatha Journal, Vol. 14, Issue 2, April-June, 2022, Pages  https://doi.org/10.21659/rupkatha.v14n2.16

First published: June 26, 2022 | Area: Performance Studies | License: CC BY-NC 4.0

(This article is published under Volume 14, Number 2, 2022)
Full-Text HTML Full-Text PDF Cite
PlumX Metrics

Abstract

Currently, there is an increased interest in ceremonial culture. A ceremonial is a kind of cultural message from one social group of people to another. The basic idea of behaviour, the inner meaning of secular ceremonial is laid down in church rituals, and external forms of behaviour can be borrowed from the traditions of everyday secular life. Diplomacy as one of the spheres of applied politics is a very complex and responsible type of human activity, which has always had a pronounced ritual character. The conclusion of contracts and alliances took place according to a certain scenario plan, according to which the ceremonial action developed. During the preparation and holding of the ceremony, the exchange of diplomatic letters and embassies continued, solemn meetings were arranged for the honored guests, feasts, theatrical performances, games, and festivities were given in their honor. the purpose of the article is to conduct a comprehensive study of the communicative functions of diplomatic ceremonial in international communication based on the analysis and generalisation of new facts with the involvement of archival materials and other sources introduced into scientific circulation for the first time. In this study, art is considered for the first time from the point of view of the communicative factor of a diplomatic ceremony. A ceremonial is an event in the life of society that has a symbolic meaning. The norms of ceremonial reflect not only ideology but also the social psychology of society, without an adequate interpretation of which it is impossible to correctly understand the behavior of statesmen in specific situations related to their official status.

Keywords: diplomacy; culture; art; political elite; ideology; society.

Introduction

By the beginning of the First World War, the Russian Empire was a state whose opinion could not be ignored. Court ceremonials, which emphasised the strength and power of the ruling dynasty, were the political programmes of the government (Golubev & Nevezhin, 2016; Gould-Davies, 2003). After the February Revolution of 1917, the politicisation of leisure became the most important feature of public life. Not only rituals, but also performances, concerts, and cinema sessions turned into political demonstrations. The Revolution used new artistic forms, decorations of demonstrations, processions, and mass celebrations. The origins of this phenomenon are in the mass celebrations of the French Revolution (Martin & Piller, 2021). The ceremonial action itself is a synthesis of the arts – pictorial design of space, music, choreography, and costume.

Already in the first years of Soviet power, the symbols of power entered “into the struggle for power.” At diplomatic ceremonies, this struggle was in the nature of a confrontation between European protocol traditions and the newly created rules of Soviet diplomatic etiquette by the staff of the Protocol Department of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (ICID). The uniform at diplomatic receptions, concert programmes, the list of dishes served – everything had to meet the norms of Bolshevik ideology (Karyagin, 1994; How to Be Diplomatic, 2022). During the leadership of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs under V. Chicherin, Protocol Department under D.T. Florinsky is a collective of creative personalities who, without being afraid to experiment, developed norms of protocol practice that have been relevant for decades, compiled in 1923 by D.T. Florinsky’s “Brief Instruction on observing the rules of Etiquette adopted in bourgeois society” was taken as a basis for the creation in 1935 of a new manual on the protocol “Diplomatic Technique” (reprinted in 1938) (AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 3. P. 101. D. 1. L. 20-25).

From the first years of its existence, the Protocol Department of the NKID (People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs) (until November 12, 1923 – the protocol division (protocol unit), took an active part in the preparation of foreign visits to the RSFSR (Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic), and since 1923 – to the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). In the 20-30s, Protocol Department employees were literally at the forefront of “diplomatic” relations, forming the foundations of Soviet protocol practice. Reports of D.T. Florinsky and comments on them by G.V. Chicherina are filled with interesting details that convey the atmosphere, and the spirit of the time with a lot of humor and self-irony. Elegant in form, they are very deep in content. Chicherin and Florinsky carefully analyse every situation that arises during visits, not to punish the guilty, but so that in the future such mistakes of the protocol service do not discredit the authorities, for many of whom the European diplomatic protocol is an external manifestation of bourgeois morality (AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 8. P. 106. D. 6. L. 157-159).

In addition to the development of regulatory documents for the preparation and conduct of foreign visits, the Protocol Department staff actively participated in the organisation of diplomatic ceremonies with the participation of diplomats accredited in Moscow and their family members. The peculiarity of the diplomatic corps’ stay in Moscow was that the embassy staff were in an unusual socio-cultural environment, the value system which was formed by the norms of Bolshevik ideology. Using the methods of agitation and propaganda, the authorities sought to form a negative attitude among citizens towards modern European culture, representatives of which were, among others, employees of diplomatic agencies.

Diplomatic life and ceremonial culture after the formation of the USSR

From 1923 to 1929, the diplomatic corps in Moscow was distinguished by the cohesion of its members and at the same time isolation from Russian reality. But at the same time, from the point of view of the development of diplomatic ceremonial culture, the life of the diplomatic corps was very busy. Receptions at embassies were arranged almost daily and were built according to a certain scenario: during lunch – conversations about politics and art, then a dance or concert program. Many accredited diplomats in Moscow were engaged in collecting objects. So, the Ambassador of France, one of the best French journalists J. Erbet acquired a collection of objects from Ural malachite. The head of the German Embassy, Count Brakdorf-Rantzau, collected antique bronze. Norwegian diplomat Dr. Urbi collected icons. Just like the Latvian Ambassador K. Ozols (2026), he believed that a modern diplomat should spend two years in Moscow to consider himself a professional. The embassies of the Baltic states were practically under siege in Moscow, as states that the USSR wanted to seize into its sphere of influence. The aggressive policy of the authorities has led to the fact that the diplomatic corps has become even more united. Receptions were held quite often at the Latvian Embassy, they were attended not only by well-known journalists, but also by representatives of the Soviet elite (Ozols, 2016). The Lithuanian Embassy occupied a special position in Moscow, largely due to the personality of the envoy Jurgis Baltrushaitis – poet, translator of Byron, Ibsen, d Annunzio, Hamsun, Wilde, Strindberg. Of the Soviet diplomats, who also needed to be included in the diplomatic corps, the most significant was G.V. Chicherin, who was a brilliant pianist, a subtle connoisseur of musical culture.

Despite an active diplomatic life, the Italian writer C. Malaparte (2018) calls the Soviet capital a provincial city in which the creativity of European writers was preferred to the creativity of European fashion designers. The Soviet nobility tried to “try on” the lifestyle of the pre-revolutionary elite of Russian society, but copying the form, it did not care about the content, about its moral and spiritual origins. The traditions of pre-revolutionary secular life continued to develop at receptions at embassies, to which representatives of the Soviet creative intelligentsia were invited. Stalin did not take part in the events of the diplomatic corps, but at the same time the entire diplomatic corps “with one voice” praised the lifestyle of the leader, whom he compared to Bonaparte after 18 Brumaire (November 9), 1799, when the Directory was dispersed in France, and the government headed by Napoleon Bonaparte came to power. Stalin was a dictator, the communist nobility was against him, in the late 20s its representatives tried to imitate Paris, London, Berlin or New York manners (Malaparte, 2018). Notably, the embassies of fascist Italy and Nazi Germany were the peculiar centers of the diplomatic life of the capital of the USSR. In the 20s, the Italian Embassy played a leading role in the life of the diplomatic corps, forming programs of diplomatic receptions, in which, for example, dancing was replaced by playing bridge.

Sports, in particular tennis, united members of the diplomatic corps, but did not contribute to their rapprochement with Soviet colleagues, who for the most part came from a working-peasant environment, were neither practically nor psychologically ready to communicate with foreign diplomats. This problem was discussed in the language of art at one of the most striking events of Soviet diplomatic life in the early 30s – the ball at the German mission (1931), at which, during a theatrical performance, the Soviet protocol was criticized for being late, not knowing foreign languages, etc. (AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 11. P. 109. D. 2. L. 73). During this period, ballroom ceremonial ceased to be a component of the state ceremonial culture, but it still remained an important component of European life. In diplomatic Moscow, balls were given not by official Soviet officials, but by members of the diplomatic corps.

It was the ballroom ceremonial, combining various types of arts, that allowed achieving the greatest emotional impact on those present, who, at the same time, were active participants in the ceremonial, owning a whole complex of relevant class norms. Of all the ceremonials, the ball had the utopian function to the greatest extent. Music, choreography, architectural decoration created an ideal environment from the point of view of artistic harmony. In the 30s, the staff of the German Embassy were the leaders of secular life, but at the same time, German diplomats did not seek to isolate the embassy and the entire diplomatic corps from the NKID staff, but were looking for ways to get closer to them. In particular, discussing protocol issues, for example, the appearance of a diplomat at official receptions.

When Hitler came to power in 1933, the music of R. Strauss and all modern German composers was banned in the USSR. Excluded were the repertoire of Wagner’s operas, which were performed on the stage of the Kiev Opera and Ballet Theater – in the 1926-1927 season – “Meistersingers”, in the 1932-1933 season – “Lohengrin” (Stefanovich, 1960). The Soviet-German agreements signed in Moscow in 1939 had a noticeable impact not only on the political, but also on the cultural development of Soviet society. In 1939, during negotiations with the German Foreign Minister in Moscow, the foundations of a new world order were laid and the map of Europe was “reshaped” considering the interests of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.

At the end of 1939, the pro-German musical policy began and the reason for this phenomenon was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. But the changes in the foreign policy of the USSR were said in the language of art a few months before the meeting in Moscow, namely on May 5, 1939. On this day, at a concert for the participants of the military May Day parade in Moscow, the “Chorus of Sailors” by R. Wagner was performed in the 3rd department. Symphony orchestras began to perform R. Strauss (Nevezhin, 2011). The Protocol is not only an instrument, but also a kind of indicator of the priorities of the state’s foreign policy, which was especially clearly manifested in the relations of the Soviet leadership with German representatives in Moscow and during the visit of I. von Ribbentrop. The totality of protocol norms as a whole demonstrated the priorities of the Kremlin leaders in the field of international relations. One of the clearest confirmations of the Kremlin’s loyalty to the chosen course aimed at establishing friendly relations with Germany was the decision to stage R. Wagner’s opera “Valkyrie” on the stage of the Bolshoi Theater by the outstanding Soviet film director S. M. Eisenstein, who openly expressed his anti-Nazi views (Golubev & Nevezhin, 2016). On November 21, the premiere of the opera, which was a kind of “greeting” of a delegation that arrived from Berlin after Molotov’s talks with Hitler and Ribbentrop.

During the Soviet period, all the details of state ceremonies were carefully developed, each of which is an illustration of the ethical norms accepted in society. As in the pre-revolutionary period, great importance was attached to the gesture, musical accompaniment, and the language of the costume. Methods of appearance design are important signals, personality signs. Clothes are a business card. The attitude towards a diplomat is related to the perception of the country he represents. In choosing a suit, the personal preferences of a diplomatic employee give way to political expediency. The “expulsion” of the tailcoat, and even earlier the top hat, from Soviet protocol practice was regarded as a victory in the struggle against bourgeois values. Modern European dances were also considered carriers of ethical norms alien to the Soviet citizen. Despite the prohibitions of the authorities, the daily, unofficial life of Soviet people was filled with foxtrot, tango, waltz, which literally “punched” their way into dance halls at different periods of history. Each of them was accused of promoting sexual promiscuity, called obscene and vulgar. And here it is very important to distinguish between the original choreography and the subsequent “processed” by classical choreographers, teachers of ballroom dancing. The ennobled returned dancing to the ballroom floor and became its kings. Each dance in different periods of history had its own semantic meaning, its own intonation at the ball, being not only an organizational link, but also a kind of expression of the basic ideas of banal ceremonial. Diplomatic privileges and immunities extended not only to diplomats, but also to the forms of their leisure, in particular, to the programs of dance evenings. Thus, the foxtrot, banned in the USSR, is performed in embassies not only by foreign diplomats, but also by the head of the protocol department of the NKID, D.T. Florinsky. The 20s were a time of searching for ways to reconcile traditional European protocol norms with the Bolshevik ideology of the Soviet state.

With the expansion of international contacts, the problem of the exchange of commemorative gifts both in the foreign missions of the USSR and in Moscow itself became more acute and urgent. Especially acute was the issue of the relationship between the authorities and the keepers of the cultural heritage of the USSR – museum workers (AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 8. P. 106. D. 10. L. 223, 223 rev). It should be noted that if the interior items that were not returned to the museum storages remained in the USSR, then the works of painting, sculpture, decorative and applied art became the cultural heritage of other states. The canvases of B.M. Kustodiev “The Beauty” (AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 8. P. 105. D.1. L. 128, 129), S.Yu. Zhukovsky “Forest in early spring” (AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 21. P. 115. D. 4. L. 19), V.I. Zarubin “Landscape with three old ladies” (AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 21. P. 115. D. 4. L. 23), K.F. Yuon “Parade on Red Square on November 7, 1941” (AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 31. P. 155. D. 20. L. 48), A.I. Laktionov “Girl for embroidery”, P.P. Konchalovsky “Lilac” (AVPRF. F. 57. Op. 41. P. 198. D. 36. L. 168), I.E. Grabar “Frost, the last rays” were used as diplomatic gifts (AVPRF. F. 57. Op. 41. P. 198. D. 36. L. 169).

Foreign guests were generously gifted with fur products, some of which can rightfully be attributed to works of art. So, in 1943, Molotov’s wife gave the wife and daughter of the representative of the President of the United States (United States of America) Davis’s outfits were made of fox and ermine, and in 1946 a sable fur coat was presented to the Princess of Iran A. Pahlavi personally from I.V. Stalin (AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 26. P. 127. D. 7. L. 18). The range of Kremlin gifts is very diverse. If in 1944 U. Churchill received as an official gift 10 kg of caviar, 15 liters of vodka and 40 packs of cigarettes, then his wife in 1945 – a diamond of 5.58 carats (AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 24. P. 120. D. 7. L. 33; AVPRF. F. 06. Op. 7. P. 22. D. 246. L. 62).”The Prime Minister’s grocery set is rather evidence of special friendly relations, since in 1944 Churchill was still “his boyfriend”, and you can also give vodka to “your own”. In turn, M.A. Churchill earned a diamond for organising Soviet aid during the war. In this regard, the question involuntarily arises – for what merits the wives and daughters of Soviet leaders received very valuable gifts from foreign guests (platinum watches with diamonds of Stalin’s daughter from I.B. Tito, etc.) (AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 26. P. 127. D. 8. L. 32).

The visit of K. Churchill was one of the first independent visits of the wife of a state leader to the USSR. The “women’s visit” forced the staff of the Protocol Department to depart from the “men’s code” of the Soviet protocol, in which the presence of women at official receptions was not welcome. The situation began to change in March 1945 during the visit of Czechoslovak President Benes and his wife to Moscow: members of the delegation were invited to dinner with Stalin (March 28) together with their wives (AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 25. P. 123. D. 8. L. 53.). Ulanova, Maksakova, Kozlovsky, Mikhailov and others performed at the concert in the Central House of the Red Army (CDKA) [25]. The President’s wife visited the Moscow Art Theater (Moscow Art Academic Theater named after M. Gorky) (the play “Russian People”) and the ballet school at the Bolshoi Theater.

It should be noted that in the programs of official foreign visits there is practically no information about the visits of guests to academic drama theaters in Moscow and other cities of the Soviet Union. The reason for this phenomenon probably lies not only in the difficulty of translation – professionals possess a number of artistic techniques that allow not only to understand the meaning of what is happening on stage, but also to feel the atmosphere itself, the mood of the performance. Probably one of the reasons is the repertory policy of theaters, which could not refuse to stage plays by foreign and pre-revolutionary domestic playwrights. But even in the traditional staging of classical works, censorship could detect an encroachment on the foundations of communist morality, at the same time, visiting the Bolshoi Theater was an important component of the programs of foreign visits to the USSR. Great music and choreography, and outstanding performers, greatly contributed to the fact that the ballet “Swan Lake” became a kind of element of Soviet classical diplomacy (Karyagin, 1994).

After the “Basic provisions of Protocol practice in the USSR” approved in 1976 by the Central Committee of the CPSU (Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), official visits to the theater were excluded from the programs of foreign visits. (AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 60. P. 260. D. 1. L. 40, 41, 43, 44). The official version is saving public funds. But in our opinion, the main reason is the confidence of the leaders of the state that their political course does not need the support of art. Moreover, in the 70s and early 80s, representatives of the creative intelligentsia, including soloists of academic opera and ballet theaters, were either expelled from the country – Vishnevskaya and V. Rostropovich – or preferred to work in foreign collectives in the Bolshoi Theater or the Kirov Theater (Mariinsky Theater) – Natalia Makarova, Rudolf Nureyev, Mikhail Baryshnikov, Alexander Godunov. But the specific features of the Kremlin leaders’ “understanding” of the significance of works of art in the political life of society in no way begs for their value.

The art of ballet forced the world community to see the USSR as a country in which the traditions of classical art continue to develop, and, consequently, human values are not alien to the Soviet state. Thus, it is possible to build partnerships with the Soviet Union, which are based on mutually beneficial cooperation. At Kremlin receptions, there was a representation of power, the process of interaction between the party leadership and the invited audience, which allowed communicating (including using the language of art) to the broad masses the main ideas of power. Individuals with a high social status, an active and trustworthy part of society, were invited to the Kremlin.

Features of the development of the cultural repertoire in Soviet Moscow

In states with a pronounced vertical of power, state policy in the field of culture largely depends on the tastes of the leaders of the state. At the same time, not only are the people deprived of the right to choose, but also the ruling elite, which for the most part was deeply mistaken about their real capabilities. The slightest violation of the designated rules of the game could lead to moral and physical destruction. The proof of the above is the Soviet musical doctrine of the 30s-50s of the twentieth century during the active process of the totalization of art in the USSR.

A comparative analysis of the programmes of government concerts in Moscow and the repertoire policy of Ukrainian theaters showed that they were united not by what was performed, but rather by what was forbidden to perform. So, in the repertoire of theaters, including concert programmes, there are no works of Hindemith, Stravinsky, Bartok, Kozelli, Schoenberg, Mesian, Penderetsky, Berg, Krshenek, Schreker and Kurt Weil. They were excluded from concert programs and theater posters after Zhdanov’s articles against Shostakovich’s music – “Confusion instead of Music” (about opera “Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk district”) and “Ballet Falsehood” (about the ballet “Light Stream”), published in January and February 1936 in the newspaper “Pravda” point to this.

In totalitarian states, the government deprives the people of the right to choose. The development of entire directions in the field of art depends on the leader’s predilection. Before the war, Stalin liked the music of I. Dzerzhinsky. As a result, the composer’s operas were staged on the stage of leading musical theaters: “Raised Virgin Land” – in Kiev (season 1937-38); in Odessa (1937), in Dnepropetrovsk (1937); “Quiet Don” – in Kiev (season 1936 – 1937), in Lviv (1940). The works of D. Shostakovich, including the opera “Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk district”, did not make a proper impression on the leader. So, it is not surprising that they were not on the theater posters of opera houses and in the programs of government concerts. At the same time, the 7th Symphony (Leningrad) was performed on February 21, 1943 on the stage of the Royal Albert Hall of Arts and Sciences in London during the theatrical performance “Salute to the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Red Army”, which is a unique event in the history of Soviet-British cultural ties (RAHE/1/1944/16).

The press noted the “grandiose” design of the stage space, which represented a stylized view of the Russian city. Each of the two thousand participants, attracted from various services, factories, civil defense institutions, as well as the London Philharmonic Orchestra, numerous Guards orchestras, outstanding artists, was an important component of the stage action, which The Times called a “triumph” (The Times, 2022). Against the background of the aggravation of allied relations caused largely by the Katyn tragedy, as well as the problem of opening a second front in Europe, a concert dedicated to the twenty-sixth anniversary of the Red Army on the stage of the Royal Albert Hall on February 23, 1944 acquires special political significance.

A kind of culmination of the concert, composed of works by outstanding composers of the English musical Renaissance, led by Edward Elgar, was the work of G.F. Handel “Hallelujan Ghorus Aroma Messiah” performed by the Royal Choral Society and the London Symphony Orchestra (The Times, 2022). Despite the fact that the concert was dedicated to the Red Army, it became an important factor in British cultural diplomacy. In London, the music of D. Shostakovich and S. Prokofiev was played, but we could not find them in the programmes of government Kremlin concerts either during the war or in the post-war periods.

In totalitarian states, the subjective factor prevails over national interests, priorities in domestic and foreign policy. Stalin loved opera. Excerpts from opera performances by Tchaikovsky, Rimsky-Korsakov, Borodin, Rossini, Gounod were performed at almost every government concert. In choreography, he preferred characteristic and national dances to classical dance. The leader did not like instrumental music, especially symphonic and chamber music. We were unable to find fragments of symphonic works by Russian and Western European composers in the programs of government concerts, as well as long-lasting compositions for solo instruments – sonatas, concerts.

Stalin considered vocal music to be the highest kind of music. These opinions of the leader were reflected in the musical Soviet policy and were theoretically justified in the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1948. In the field of folk music, he preferred Ukrainian and Russian folk songs. The Kremlin leaders had a special dislike for vocal and instrumental modernist music. Thus, Stalin’s tastes formed the basis of strict control in the field of musical creativity. The musical doctrine of the Soviet government was based on the musical tastes of the leader. This doctrine wore the mask of “socialist realism in music.” But it was the “mask” under which the music that gave Stalin pleasure, the works that acted on the leader “like a dentist’s drill or a musical slaughterhouse” (as Zhdanov put it), were excluded from the repertoire. In February 1948, the Moscow central newspapers published a resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) (Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Bolsheviks) about the opera “The Great Friendship” by Vano Muradelli, in addition to the author, D. Shostakovich, S. Prokofiev, A. Khachaturian, B. Lyatoshinsky, V. Shebalin, N. Myaskovsky.

Lviv Theater excluded the opera V. Muradelli and other “dubious” performances in the light of the new party decrees. In Lviv, Prokofiev and Khachaturian were “rehabilitated” only in 1965, when the ballets “Cinderella” and “Spartak” were staged on the stage of the theater. In 1985, S. Prokofiev’s opera “War and Peace” was presented to the audience. It is a mistake to say that only modern music was subject to the ban. What the leader did not like and did not understand, for example, the Viennese operetta, was not performed. Ballet “The Big Waltz” to the music of I. Strauss was stopped in Lviv in 1957, and the operettas “The Gypsy Baron” and “The Bat” – in 1960 and 1982, respectively. In the 40s, paradoxically, the cultural programmes of the Allies contributed more to the creation of a positive image of the USSR – a theatrical performance (1943) and a concert (1944) at the Royal Albert Hall – than the programmes of government concerts in the Kremlin and the Bolshoi Theater. A performance glorifying the Red Army was created in the Albert Hall, and in Moscow in the same year a reception was held at the Spiridonovka, which was more famous for abundant treats, rather than a concert programme. The “thaw” that came in the mid-50s forced Soviet leaders to reconsider the style and methods of international activity.

The number of diplomatic missions accredited in Moscow increased from 1918 to 1945 from 2 to 32. In 1960, the USSR already had diplomatic relations with 69 states, 53 foreign diplomatic missions were accredited in Moscow. Soviet leaders practically did not attend receptions at embassies, diplomatic staff, military personnel, cultural figures were sent there – all according to the approved list. In the early-mid-50s, the Soviet government began to take measures aimed at establishing active contacts with the diplomatic corps, providing it with information about new achievements, processes in the development of the economy, science, culture, etc. The protocol service organized regular screenings of new works of cinematography and theater, trips around the country, meetings with representatives of the creative intelligentsia.

In 1953-1954, conditioned upon the intensification of the USSR’s foreign policy, more international meetings, congresses, festivals, exhibitions, etc. began to be held. In the “activation” of work with the diplomatic corps, the main role was assigned to cultural programs. In the Bolshoi Theater, in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses, separate seats were assigned to diplomats. In the representative mansion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) Since January 1963, the USSR has organised weekly screenings of feature films, monthly author’s evenings of famous cultural figures. The demands to take measures to “activate” work with the diplomatic corps were repeated in the decisions of the Board in the 70s and 80s.

In 1970, the British Council (a semi-governmental organization operating under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the field of cultural, scientific and other humanitarian exchanges) promoted the organisation of an exhibition of ancient Chinese drawings in London. In exchange, Beijing received the London Symphony Orchestra. In diplomacy, this cooperation has been called “symphonic ping-pong”. “Ping Pong diplomacy” became a household name after the Chinese-American table tennis match, which marked the beginning of active relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (People’s Republic of China).

Conclusion

In the early years of Soviet power, representatives of the workers’ and peasants’ government tried to ignore the norms of diplomatic protocol and etiquette, arguing that they were based on bourgeois morality alien to the young Soviet Republic. But already in the early 20s it became obvious that it is impossible to build partnerships with foreign countries without observing generally accepted European norms, traditions and conventions in international communication.

In the post-war years, the isolation of part of the diplomatic corps continued on an ideological basis. Such a situation could not but influence the behaviour of the members of the diplomatic corps in Moscow, in which there was, along with the traditional, a kind of diplomatic counterculture, that is, the deliberate disregard by the participants of international communication of the accepted protocol norms, and the rules of respect and politeness in international communication. Behind the seemingly “dry” language of the protocol are specific individuals with their habits and characters. In the system of international relations, art as a communicative factor not only poses problems, but also contributes to their resolution.

The study identified that art is a communicative factor not only in classical, but also in public diplomacy. In this regard, the profession of a diplomat implies communication both with persons provided for by the protocol service, and with scientists, writers, musicians, artists. Otherwise, diplomacy will remain an archaic institution that ignores public opinion, denies the possibilities of public diplomacy, and, consequently, the role of “soft power” in world politics, which defends the national interests of the state peacefully, using, among other things, the language of art in state ceremonies.

Declaration of Conflict of Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest.

Funding

No funding has been received for the publication of this article. It is published free of any charge.

References

AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 11. P. 109. D. 2. L. 73.

AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 21. P. 115. D. 4. L. 19.

AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 21. P. 115. D. 4. L. 23.

AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 24. P. 120. D. 7. L. 33.

AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 25. P. 123. D. 8. L. 53.

AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 25. P. 123. D. 8. L. 74.

AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 26. P. 127. D. 7. L. 18.

AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 26. P. 127. D. 8. L. 32.

AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 3. P. 101. D. 1. L. 20-25.

AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 31. P. 155. D. 20. L. 48.

AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 60. P. 260. D. 1. L. 40, 41, 43, 44.

AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 8. P. 105. D.1. L. 128, 129.

AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 8. P. 106. D. 10. L. 223, 223 rev.

AVPRF. F. 057. Op. 8. P. 106. D. 6. L. 157-159.

AVPRF. F. 06. Op. 7. P. 22. D. 246. L. 62.

AVPRF. F. 57. Op. 41. P. 198. D. 36. L. 168.

AVPRF. F. 57. Op. 41. P. 198. D. 36. L. 169.

Golubev, A.V., & Nevezhin, V.A. (2016). Formation of the image of Soviet Russia in the surrounding world by means of cultural diplomacy (1920s – first half of the 1940s). Moscow: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives.

Gould-Davies, N. (2003). The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy. Diplomatic History, 27(2), 193-214.

How to Be Diplomatic. (2022). https://www.theschooloflife.com/thebookoflife/how-to-be-diplomatic/

Karyagin, V.V. (1994). Diplomatic life behind the scenes and on stage. Moscow: LLC “International Relations Publisher”

Malaparte, K. (2018). The Kremlin Ball. New York: NYRB Classics.

Martin, B.G., & Piller, E.M. (2021). Cultural Diplomacy and Europe’s Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: Introduction. Contemporary European History, 30(2), 149-163.

Nevezhin, V.A. (2011). Feasts of Joseph Stalin. Moscow: Novyy Khronograf.

Ozols, K. (2016). Memoirs of an envoy. Moscow: Centerpolygraph.

RAHE/1/1944/16.

Stefanovich, M.P. (1960). Kyiv Opera and Ballet Theatre. Kyiv: Book factory “October” of the Main Polygraph Publishing House of the Ministry of Culture of the USSR.

The Times. (2022). https://www.thetimes.co.uk/